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Law and Social Change 
Conclusions 
Frances Hamilton, Senior Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University 
This edited collection has analysed the necessity for both legal and social change with regard to 
regulation of same-sex relationships and rainbow families, the status of civil partnership as a concept 
and the lived reality of equality for LGBTQ+ persons.  The current  treatment of LGBTQ+ persons and 
same-sex couples by the Council of Europe, the European Union and further internationally has been 
examined. Whilst same-sex marriage is legal in 28 jurisdictions worldwide, other states provide  
varying degree of civil partnership rights and still others refuse to recognise same-sex couples’ rights 
or even criminalise same-sex relationships. The competing views of critically analytical rights based 
theorists and those developing queer and feminist theory, represented in this edited collection, expose 
that even for those jurisdictions who have legalised same-sex marriage, still further and continuous 
work needs to be done. Legal and social change need to work together on an evolving basis over time 
in order to contribute to future development. Incrementalism recommends a model of ‘small change’ 
but has been critiqued throughout this book. 
Analysis 
This book has involved a series of inter-locking themes, including (Part One) the role of the ECtHR and 
the EU in relation to the treatment of same-sex couples’ relationships, (Part Two) differing paths 
towards legalisation of same-sex marriage, (Part Three) rainbow families, (Part Four) the importance 
of civil partnership pin an era of same-sex marriage (Part Five) the heteronormative underpinnings of 
same-sex marriage and (Part Six) the interaction between social change and legal change. Many 
chapters in this work investigate the potential opportunities open to  the EU in protecting the rights of 
LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples and the consequent potential impact of Brexit for these persons 
based in the UK.1 Whilst traditionally the EU was even stricter than the ECtHR in recognising non-
conventional family types,2 Hamilton’s chapter has demonstrated that EU law has potential to further 
advance LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples’ rights. 3  The EU concept of citizenship, which 
 





proceeds on the basis of an ever-expanding array of practical rights, has recently stressed free movement 
and non-discrimination rights, offering many  opportunities for the groups studied.4 Both the Coman5 
and MB6 case studies included in Hamilton’s chapter exemplify the importance of EU action.7  In 
Coman, subsidiarity concerns were over-ridden in preference for the principle of free movement.8 
Similarly in MB, non-discrimination rights were given prominence as opposed to Member States’ public 
policy concerns.9 Whilst the CJEU sought to confine both Coman and MB case strictly to their facts,10  
these cases are symbolical important11  and may signal further developments from the CJEU.  
In contrast the ECtHR continues to stress concerns about a lack of consensus.12 The Council of Europe 
47 states are more divergent 13  than the arguably more homogeneous currently EU28 (although 
differences should not be ignored here).14 The EU can rely on stronger enforcement mechanisms than 
the ECtHR through use of EU concepts of supremacy15 and state liability.16 If as anticipated, Brexit 
were to affect free movement of persons, UK LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples will have to rely 
on whatever rights their country of destination sees fit to grant them. Further if Brexit impacts on the 
remit of the CJEU, UK LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples will miss out on important 
developments in relation to expanding EU law.  
Noto La Diega and Clayton-Helm grapple with conflicts of law questions concerning whether and how 
a foreign same-sex relationship will be recognised, following relocation of the couple to a new 
jurisdiction. Noto La Diega after conducting empirical research 17  on the response to the Coman 
judgment18  concluded that European countries could be placed into three groups, which he terms 
 
4 Hamilton. 
5 Case C-673/16 Relu Adrian Coman, Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept v Inspectoratul General 
pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne ECLI:EU:C:2018:2. 
6 Case C-451/16 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ECLI:EU:C:2018:492. 
7 Hamilton. 
8 Coman (n 5).  
9 MB (n 6).  
10 Coman (n 5) and MB (n 6). 
11 Alina Tryfonidou, ‘The EU Top Court  Rules that Married Same-Sex Couples Can Move Freely Between EU 
Member States as “Spouses’: Case C-673/16, Relu Adrian Coman  Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept 
v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne’ (2019) Feminist Legal Studies 1. 
12 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010). 
13 Including countries such as Russia where gay propaganda laws are still in force. See Paul Johnson, 
‘Homosexual Propaganda’ in the Russian Federation: Are They in Violation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights?’ (2015) 3 Russian Law Journal 37. 
14 For instance, with Eastern European countries.  
15 See Tryfonidou (n11) for discussion. 
16  The state liability principle was established in Case C-6/60 and C-9/90 Francovich v Italy 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:428. 
17 Noto La Diega carried out twenty semi-structured email interviews with lawyers representing LGBTQ+ 
persons, LGBTQ+ organisations and police officers. 




recognition, downgrading and erasure.19  Whilst some countries went further than required by Coman 
and recognised same-sex marriages as marriages for all purposes, 20  others in Noto La Diega’s 
terminology ‘downgraded’ a foreign same-sex marriage and recognised this as a civil partnership only.21  
Whilst Hayward analyses whether a civil partnership should be considered a ‘downgrade’,22 countries 
in Noto La Diega’s second denoted group did not recognise foreign same-sex marriage in their original 
form.23  Still other states contravened EU and ECtHR law entirely24  by refusing to recognise foreign 
same-sex marriages at all thereby falling into Noto La Diega’s erasure group.25 This divergence of 
practical response serves to illustrate that legal change will never suffice, if in practice lack of social 
acceptance results in a lack of enforcement.  
 
Clayton-Helm’s chapter considers the potential power of a unified conflicts of law system under an EU 
umbrella.26 Clayton-Helm proceeds by comparative law analysis with the US following Obergefell.27 
Whilst following Coman the EU determined that same-sex marriages had to be recognised cross-border 
for the purpose of free movement and residency rights,28 in Obergefell the US Supreme Court required 
full legalisation of same-sex marriage across the  US. 29  US federal unity was achieved despite 
traditional lack of involvement by the Supreme Court in family law30 and many divergent approaches 
between US states as to the status of legal recognition of same-sex marriage.31  Clayton-Helm argues 
that the US Supreme Court set a precedent32  for the EU and concludes that a unified federal approach 
is the ‘only way to achieve certainty.’33 This conclusion should be properly balanced against Noto La 
Diega’s research which already demonstrates a more divergent response to Coman across the EU than 
is actually required by law. The historically narrow competence of the CJEU to deal with family law is 
also relevant.34 However, Clayton-Helm’s chapter does demonstrate the potential impact of EU law.35 
 
19 Noto La Diega.  
20 Coman (n 5) only requires the receiving country to recognise same-sex marriages for the purposes of free 
movement and residency, and does not require the receiving country to legalise same-sex marriage.  
21 An example here is Italy. 
22 Hayward. 
23 Noto La Diega. 
24 Noto La Diega. 
25 Example here is Hungary.  
26 Clayton-Helm. 
27 Obergefell v Hodges 576 US, 135 S Ct 2584 (2015).  
28 Coman (n 5). 
29 Obergefell v Hodges (n 27). 
30 Clayton-Helm.  
31 Sheldon D Pollock, ‘Same-Sex Marriage and the Conflict of Law: The “Other” Constitutional Issue’ (2015) 
13 Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 477. 
32 Clayton-Helm referring to Obergefell (n 27).  
33 Clayton-Helm.  
34 Aude Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: is the Europeanization of Family Law Going too Far?’ 
(2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 178. 
35 Clayton-Helm.  
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Once again, following the likely impact of Brexit, UK citizens would no longer be able to benefit from 
these potential further advances by EU law.  
 
Further chapters analyse different methods of introducing same-sex marriage. Aloni explains that 
incrementalists36 prefer legislative to judicial methods as they allow ‘public opinion to adapt and change 
gradually’ 37  and mitigate the potential of a backlash following a far-reaching court judgment. 38  
However Aloni argues that ‘grim’ concerns following Obergefell have largely been unfounded, and 
backlash has been weak.39 Sperti’s chapter demonstrates that the ‘apparent contrast’ between legislative 
and court-based methods should not be exaggerated.40 In fact she considers that the similarity in synergy 
between national legislators and constitutional courts needs to be acknowledged…’41  Prior to the far-
reaching judgments of United States and Canada who introduced same-sex marriage through 
constitutional courts by declaring violations of human rights,42 earlier work had already been done. 
Earlier case law had created important relationships between movements, government officials and 
citizens thereby developing public opinion. 43 European constitutional courts in deferring to national 
legislatures, should also not be depicted as overly deferent. 44 In fact Sperti argues that the strategy of 
European legislatures was not dissimilar to that of countries taking court based approaches. European 
legislatures were only able to act following earlier court cases which developed issues such as defining 
key terms such as family and challenging stereotypes about LGBTQ+ persons, thereby opening up 
public debate and allowing space for action.45  
 
Tobin and Richardson-Self et al analyse the introduction of same-sex marriage by means of votes from 
the population. 46  Whilst Tobin rightly acknowledges the ‘milestone’ 47   achievement of same-sex 
marriage in the ROI, he considers that the referendum was only chosen as a method of legalisation due 
 
36 See Aloni referring to Kees Waaldijk, ‘Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the 
Netherlands’ in Robert Wintermute and Mads Andenæs (eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A 
Study of Nation, Europe, and International Law (Hart Publishing 2001). 
37 Frances Hamilton, ‘Strategies to Achieve Same-Sex Marriage and the Method of Incrementalist Change’ 
(2015-2016) 25 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 121, 140-144.  
38 Aloni. 
39 Aloni referring to Katherine Franke, Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality (NYU Press 2015). 
40 Sperti.  
41 Sperti.  
42 Sperti referring to Obergefell v Hodges (n 27) and Canadian examples such as M v H [1999] 2 SCR 3 
(Canada). 
43 See Sperti referring to Reva B Siegel, ‘Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash’ (2017) 64 
UCLA L Rev 1728. 
44 Sperti referring to examples from Spain, Portugal, France and Germany.  
45 Sperti. 
46 Tobin and Richardson-Self. 
47 Tobin referring to Omar Encarnacion, ‘There’s Something about Marriage’ (Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2015) 
<www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ireland/2015-05-31/theres-something-about-marriage> accessed 11 Feb 2019. 
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to political expediency. His chapter relates ‘…on-going circuitousness’ between the Oireachtas (the 
Irish Parliament)’48 and the courts, neither of wished to expressly support the cause of marriage equality 
for ‘…fear of backlash…’49 Instead they selected to pass the matter to a constitutional convention 
(consisting of 33 Members of the Irish Parliament and 66 citizens representing a cross section of Irish 
society) who recommended a referendum. Although the referendum was ultimately successful by a 
huge margin,50 Tobin considered this to a be a high-risk strategy because of the history of failed 
referendums in the ROI.51  
 
Richardson-Self et al’s analysis of the Australian non-compulsory Marriage Law Postal Survey 
demonstrates that this also followed a long drawn out history of debate and deadlock between 
conservatives and progressives in both major parties and following proposals for a referendum being 
blocked. 52  There had been myriad attempts to introduce Bills at Federal level 53  and instances of 
backlash from federal government following advances by individual Australian states.54 Ultimately 
79.5% of the population voted with a high margin of 61.6% in favour of change. Richardson-Self et al’s 
analysis of data obtained through 9 qualitative interviews with LGBTQ+ Tasmanians working in 
government funded religious organisations and schools55 demonstrates that the referendum also entailed 
negative consequences. 56 The NO campaign, unhampered by the ‘stringent advertising restrictions 
which apply to federal elections..’ consequently spread ‘deliberately misleading’ misinformation about 
the LGBTQ+ community57 leading to ‘prejudicial public scrutiny’ and consequent  pain and suffering 




50 In ROI the referendum was successful by 62.07% to 37.93%. 
51 Tobin referring to Census 2011, This is Ireland: Part 1 (CSO 2012). 
52 Richardson-Self et al. 
53 Richardson-Self et al refers to Deirdre McKeown, ‘Chronology of Same-Sex Marriage Bills Introduced into the 
Federal Parliament: A Quick Guide’ (Parliament of Australia, 15 February 2018). 
<www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick
_Guides/SSMarriageBills> accessed 2 January 2019. 
54 Richardson-Self et al who refers to the example of Tasmania.  
55 Richardson-Self et al explains that ‘[t]he recruitment of employees from faith-based organisations was driven 
by the possibility that changes to federal legislation could mean that LGBTQ+ employees in Tasmanian religious 
organisations may be discriminated against in the future, if a right to discriminate on religious grounds is 
introduced.  (This would not be the case in secular organisations.)  
56  Richardson-Self et al.  
57 Richardson-Self et al referring to Matt Connellan, ‘“Deliberately Misleading”: First “Vote No” to Same-Sex 
Marriage Advertisement Airs’ (SBS News, 30 August 2017) <www.sbs.com.au/news/deliberately-misleading-
first-vote-no-to-same-sex-marriage-advertisement-airs> accessed 4 January 2018 
58 Richrdson-Self referring to Quinn Eades and Son Vivienne (eds), Going Postal: More than ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. One 
Year On: Writings from the Marriage Equality Survey (Brow Books 2018). 




on the basis of advocacy which ‘emphasised sameness60 resulting in heteronormativity.61 This approach 
resonates with other campaigns across the Western World.62 Whilst it may ‘’explain the high voter 
turnout’63 the achievement of marriage ‘equality’ in Australia on this analysis was bought at a cost. 
Richardson-Self et al refer to other authors who suggest that marriage equality ‘privilege[s] the most 
‘central’ member of the LGBTQ+ community—namely cisgender, white, middle- and upper-class gays 
and, to an extent, lesbians [but on the other hand]—it leaves its most vulnerable members’ concerns on 
the sidelines.’ 64  Following marriage ‘equality’ in Australia, clear-cut conclusions have not been 
reached. Questions remain, particularly in the light of proposals from some faith-based organisations to 
introduce a ‘right discriminate’ on grounds of religious belief.65   
 
Burton’s chapter utilises examples from contemporary culture to outline a number of new legal 
questions raised by changes in society when considering same-sex couples and transpersons whose 
children form rainbow families. She highlights issues concerned with surrogacy66 and the case of male 
transpersons who have retained their female reproductive organs and subsequently given birth to the 
children.67 Burton’s chapter also serves to illustrate that legal change is far from complete and that 
social changes concerning rainbow families continue to challenge judges and legislators in a series of 
ever expanding and novel contexts.68 Further complexities are brought into play by rainbow families 
who cross international borders. Tryfonidou critically analyses EU treatment of rainbow families and 
stresses the need for EU judges and institutions to ‘fashion rules and principles that reflect the reality 
of the lives of rainbow families, when such families move between EU Member States.’69 Her chapter 
again exemplifies the continued need for legal development in this area, particularly on a pan EU level, 
given the diversity of treatment across EU states when considering same-sex couples’ parental rights70  
and limited access to surrogacy and medically assisted reproduction.71 Like Hamilton and Clayton-
Helm’s chapters, Tryfonidou’s chapter demonstrates the opportunities for future development by the 
EU. Schuster considers the ECtHR’s notion of ‘family life’ as the cornerstone of a pan-European 
 
60 Richardson-Self et al.  
61 Richardson-Self et al.  
62 Richardson-Self et al referring to Louise Richardson-Self, Justifying Same-Sex Marriage: A Philosophical 
Investigation (Rowman and Littlefield International 2015). See also Donovan. 
63 Richard-Self et al.  
64 Richardson-Self et al referring to Gorrie and Ison’s in Quinn Eades and Son Vivienne (n 58). 





70 Tryfonidou referring to ILGA Europe Rainbow Europe Package: Annual Review and Rainbow Europe Map 
2019 available at <https://rainbow-europe.org> last accessed 13 May 2019. 




standard of family. Despite the EU not having competence to harmonise family law, it has enacted laws 
that refer to the concepts of spouse and child. He notes that EU law can self-define the notion of family 
life (Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) as well as the rights to family and found 
a family. Their meaning and scope must be the same as the European Convention, although EU law can 
provide a stronger protection.72 Schuster argues that the EU standard of ‘family’ should not result from 
the commonalities between Member States; some of them are in breach of EU fundamental rights 
because of their narrow idea of family. Constitutional definitions of ‘family’ and ‘marriage’ shall not 
shape the EU relevant standard; indeed, European fundamental rights shall prevail also on national 
constitutional principles.73 He concludes that the EU should not impose a EU-wide definition of family 
and that ‘[p]luralism and respect for the diversity of Europe’s family patterns is the only viable common 
standard to ensure free movement.’ 
 
Hayward explores the status of civil partnership in an era of same-sex marriage. He refers to sources 
who describe marriage as a ‘cornerstone’74  and emphasise the ‘historical role… ceremonial rites and 
… symbolism’75 associated with marriage. The status  ascribed to civil partnership is less certain. In 
many nations, as Ryan corroborates in an ROI context,76 civil partnership has been treated as a ‘stepping 
stone’ and is abolished following the introduction of same-sex marriage.77 Noto La Diega’s analysis 
also considers civil partnership to be a ‘downgrade’, when on  relocation a same-sex couples’ marriage 
is not recognised and they are instead provided with civil partnership as an alternative status.78  In a UK 
context , at the time of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 leading gay rights movement Stonewall, 
considered civil partnership to be ‘preferable to marriage’.79  However this contentment soon dissolved 
and Burton points out that the equal marriage campaign quickly stepped up its demand for same-sex 
marriage.80  Yet the accuracy of seeing civil partnership as a ‘stepping-stone’ only or as inferior to 
marriage is debatable. Ryan explains that the reason the ROI abolished civil partnership as a status was 
because of government concerns that its continued existence, thereby allowing individuals a choice 
 
72 Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
73 Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2000:2. 
74 Hayward referring to Sebastian Poulter, ‘The Definition of Marriage in English Law’ (1979) 42 Modern Law 
Review 409 and Rebecca Probert, ‘Hyde v Hyde: Defining or Defending Marriage?’ [2007] Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 322. 
75 Hayward.  
76 Ryan.  
77  See referring to Jens M Scherpe and Andy Hayward, The Future of Registered Partnerships – Family 
Recognition beyond Marriage? (Intersentia 2017). 
78 Noto La Diega.  
79 Erez Aloni, ‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriage’(2010-2011) 18 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 105, 156 referring to Beccy Shipman and 
Carol Smart, ‘It’s Made a Huge Difference’: Recognition, Rights and the Personal Significance of Civil 




between civil partnership and marriage, ‘would undermine constitutional safeguards for marriage as 
some couples may favour civil partnership over marriage.’ 81  The ECtHR also considers civil 
partnership as having an ‘intrinsic value.’ 82 Maine and Aloni’s analysis also emphasises the importance 
of a ‘a fresh new legal institution …’83  echoing sentiments expressed by the opposite-sex partners 
behind the Steinfeld litigation as presenting an opportunity to break free from the institution of marriage 
with its traditional religious and patriarchal connotations.84 Hayward concludes optimistically that civil 
partnership has developed a ‘nascent ideology’85 which needs full consideration where the future of 
civil partnership is concerned.  
 
Following analysis of  twenty semi-structured interviews with LGBTQ+ persons aged 20 - 67 in 
Newcastle in 2016, Maine concludes that despite the legalisation of same-sex marriage, and the 
achievement of hetereosexual civil partnership, relationship recognition in the UK still  reinforces 
Rubin’s sexual hierarchy.86 The latter concept determines how ‘[m]odern Western societies appraise 
sex acts according to a hierarchical system of sexual value. Marital, reproductive, heterosexuals are 
alone at the top erotic pyramid.’87 Maine’s analysis demonstrates that heteronormativity is privileged 
and that the new regimes promote coupled, domestic same-sex and different-sex relationships. He 
concludes that this means that ‘non-marital relationships… are still excluded…’88 Individuals which do 
not fit the prism of monogamous relationships such as homoradicals (those participants who wish to 
engage in non-monogamous, kink or public sex) are side-lined and do not receive any legal protection, 
or even criminalised.89 Donovan also attaches the caveat that whilst marriage is available to almost any 
adult couple in England and Wales this is providing ‘they identify with a recognised binary gender 
identity.’90 This provides another example demonstrating that legal change is not all encompassing, and 
the law needs to continually evaluate the needs of the population in its regulation of recognised 
relationship statuses.  
 
Ryan interrogates the heteronormative underpinnings of marriage. He explains that until recent 
legalisation of same-sex marriage in some jurisdictions, throughout history marriage  law was ‘…solely 
 
81 Ryan referring to Dáil Debates Vol. 890, 23 September 2015. 
82 See Vallianatos v Greece (2013) 59 EHRR 519, [81] and Oliari and Others v Italy (2015) 65 EHRR 957 [174].  
83 Aloni and Maine 
84 R (Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development [2018] UKSC 32. 
85 Hayward.  
86 Maine referring to Gayle Rubin, 'Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality' in 
Carole S Vance (ed), Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (Routledge 1984) 151. 






with a heterosexual model of family life in mind.’91 Consequently, his chapter considers that as a result 
marriage law is ‘fundamentally heteronormative.’92 This ties in to Hayward’s reference to Norrie who 
considers that ‘[e]quality is granted, but only on heterosexual terms’.93 Richardson-Self et al also refer 
to the further important factor of feminist, leftist, and queer criticisms of the marriage equality.94 They 
refer to Daniel Thomas who considers that whilst issues with gender and sexual diversity are framed in 
‘[cis]heteronormative terms… [this means] that it ultimately…positions gender and sexually diverse 
people within a hierarchically inferior position to [cis]heterosexuals.’95 Donovan also considers that 
pursuit of equality is a flawed agenda raising concerns of other feminists and queer theorists about the 
sameness and difference debate, considering that legal equality may not be a desirable goal, because 
‘…why should LGBTQ+ people want to achieve equality with what heterosexual people have when 
that ‘standard’ of normality might be fundamentally flawed.’96  Whilst this criticisms of lack of real 
equality call for future and ongoing legal and social reform, in the context of this debate it should not 
be forgotten that some individuals are passionate believers in a right to enter into same-sex marriage. 
Hamilton referring to others argues that for some proponents of same-sex marriage this is seen as a 
‘right central to citizenship.’97 Recognition of same-sex marriage allows a choice for those such as 
petitioner Sue Wilkinson in the Wilkinson v Kritzinger case who considered marriage as a ‘gold-
standard.’98 This accords with research from Pew which demonstrates growing public opinion in favour 




93 Hayward referring to Kenneth McK Norrie, ‘Marriage is for heterosexuals – may the rest of us be saved from 
it’ [2000] Child and Family Law Quarterly 363. 
94 Louise Richardson-Self, ‘Questioning the Goal of Same-Sex Marriage’ (2012) 27 Australian Feminist Studies 
205. 
95 Richardson Self et al. referring to Daniel Jay Thompson, ‘Your Parents Will Read This: Reading (as) Parents 
in Journalistic Coverage of the Safe Schools Coalition Australia Controversy’ (2018) Journalism 
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1464884918755638> accessed 30 June 2019. 
96 Donovan referring as an example to Rosemary Auchmuty. ‘What’s so special about marriage? The impact of 
Wilkinson v Kitzinger’ (2008) 20 Child and Family Quarterly 475. 
97 Hamilton referring as an example to example Nicholas Bamforth, ‘Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary 
Constitutional Argument’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 477; Michel Rosenfeld, 
‘Introduction: Gender, Sexual Orientation and Equal Citizenship’ (2012) 10 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 340; David Bradley, ‘Comparative Law, Family Law and Common Law’ (2003) 33 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 127. 
98 Sue Wilkinson in her Witness Statement contained in Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) at para 
6. 
99  See Pew Research Centre, ‘Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage’ (14 May 2019) <www.pewforum.org/fact-
sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/> Accessed 16 September 2019. Pew Research Centre who has 
surveyed public opinion on same-sex marriage since 2001 and documents increasing support for this.  




leading cases101  and the changing position of gay rights movements to adopt a more positive view 
towards same-sex marriage.102 
 
Ryan uses examples from both England and Wales and the ROI to illustrate differences in legal 
regulation of same-sex relationships as opposed to heterosexual relationships, therefore on his analysis 
demonstrating the heteronormativity of marriage equality. 103 At present and until no-fault divorce 
legislation is re-introduced into Westminster, adultery is a ground for divorce for heterosexual couples 
in England and Wales but not for same-sex couples.  The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 states that 
‘[o]nly conduct between the respondent and a person of the opposite sex may constitute adultery...’104   
In Irish law although the Marriage Act 2015 is technically silent on the point ,105  Ryan refers to Shatter’s 
definition of adultery to include  ‘.. some penetration of the female vagina by the male organ.’106  There 
is also a difference in treatment between same-sex and opposite sex couples, in the law’s treatment of 
whether the lack of ability consummate a marriage remains a ground for annulment. Law in the ROI, 
Northern Ireland,107 and England and Wales,108 allows a marriage to be voidable on those grounds for 
opposite sex couples.109 However for same-sex couples the inability or refusal to consummate is not a 
ground for dissolution of English and Welsh civil partnerships 110  or same-sex marriages. 111  With 
reference to the ROI, Ryan refers to consummation as being ‘ordinary and complete’ sexual intercourse 
after the solemnisation’ 112  with the core question in such cases is whether there is the ‘practical 
possibility of full penetration by the male into the female.’113 
 
Ultimately, Ryan concludes that this difference in treatment leads to the ‘[t]he unmistakable implication 
that the law regards homosexual infidelity as less serious and pressing a concern..‘114 His analysis 
 
101 See for example Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass 2003); Loving v Virginia, 
388 US 1 (1967) and Obergefell v Hodges (n 27). 
102 See for example Yvonne Zylan, States of Passion, Identity and Social Construction of Desire (OUP 2011) 205 
referring to Evan Wolfson, ‘Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the 
Intra-Community Critique’ (1994) 21 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 567 at 611. 
103 Ryan. 
104 Ryan referring to section 1(6) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
105 Ryan. 
106 Ryan referring to Alan Shatter, Shatter’s Family Law, (4th edn. LexisNexis Butterworth’s 1997) 345. 
107 Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (NI), Art.14(a) 
108 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s12(1)(a). 
109 Ryan explains that ‘The consequence of this is that the marriage is ‘voidable rather than void’ meaning that 
the marriage is technically continuing, but providing a spouse the ability to avoid a marriage.’ 
110 Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK), ss 50 and 174. See also s 107 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights 
and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Ir). 
111 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (E&W), s.12(2) as inserted by the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act 2013 
(E&W). 
112 Ryan referring to Shatter,(n 106) 209. 




demonstrates a continued lack of equality in the actual legal provisions in place in England and Wales 
and ROI.  Ryan considers that care needs to be taken regarding risks that judges will apply ‘heterosexual 
norms.’115 He refers to Rundle in observing that ‘same-sex couples have very particular experiences 
and perspectives that may demand a somewhat different approach…’116 therefore requiring ‘flexibility’ 
to accommodate different couples.117 Once again the achievement of marriage ‘equality’ in England 
and Wales and ROI is not the end of the story.  
 
Donovan’s chapter demonstrates that despite extensive legal reform and the introduction of same-sex 
marriage, there remains a distinct lack of equality for LGBTQ+ people experiencing domestic violence 
and abuse (DVA). LGBTQ+ person experiencing DVA, may not recognise it as such, may stay in DVA 
relationships for longer periods‘118 and still rarely report to formal, mainstream statutory (e.g. police) 
or third sector specialist domestic violence organisations. 119  She considers that this lack of lived 
equality for LGBTQ+ persons experiencing DVA is a result of three main factors. Firstly, because of 
the historical portrayal of LGBTQ+ persons as ‘deviant’ having been ‘…socially constructed as 
criminals, pathological or morally questionable.’ 120  Secondly because of the impact of 
‘neoliberalism’121 on sexualities equalities policies and finally because of the social construction of 
DVA in a heteronormative fashion. This may result in vulnerable LGBTQ+ individuals experiencing 
DVA being disenfranchised.  
 
Donovan referencing Richardson122  portrays citizenship as based on a ‘heteronormative, neoliberal 
agenda’ 123  which promotes the ‘responsibilised citizen’ who can action their own rights. 124  This 
 
115 Ryan 
116 Ryan referring to Olivia Rundle, ‘Following the Legislative Leaders: Judicial Recognition of Same Sex 
Couples in Australia and New Zealand’ in Daniele Gallo, Luca Paladini and Pietro Pustorino (eds) Same-Sex 
Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Springer-Verlag 2014) 136. 
117 Ryan. 
118 Donovan 
119 Donovan referring to Catherine Donovan and Marianne Hester, ‘Seeking help from the enemy: help-seeking 
strategies of those in same-sex relationships who have experienced domestic abuse’ (2011) 23 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 26 and Damien Riggs and others. ‘Domestic Violence Service Providers’ Capacity for 
Supporting Transgender Women: Findings from an Australian Workshop’ (2016) 46 British Journal of Social 
Work 2374. 
120 Donovan referring as an example to Catherine Donovan and Rebecca Barnes, ‘Being ‘ideal’ or falling short? 
The legitimacy of lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender victims of domestic violence and hate crime’ in 
Marian Duggan (ed), Revisiting The Ideal Victim Concept (Policy Press 2018). 
121 Donovan refers to ‘the neoliberal [concept of the] responsibilised citizen, responsible for their successes and 
failures is one such trend’ as further conceptuatlised by Diane Richardson, 'Desiring sameness? The rise of a 
neoliberal politics of normalisation' (2005) 37 Antipode 515; Diane Richardson, ‘Rethinking Sexual Citizenship’ 
(2017) 51 Sociology 208. 





analysis of citizenship results in a divide between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ gays.’125  The primary category 
comply with the ‘heteronormative social order’ including monogamy and family life. 126 The latter 
category either by choice or as a result of being socially excluded, become marginalised and despite 
myriad law reforms including same-sex relationships recognition and equal parenting opportunities 
become unable to access any legal rights, thereby impeding their citizenship.127 This leads Donovan 
referencing others to state that ‘law has long been identified as one of the barriers to achieving 
sex/gender equality.128 On this view marriage ‘equality’ if seen as a conclusion, where this contributes 
to the creation of  ‘sexual hierarchies’129 and the marginalization of others, could actually prevents the 
citizenship of LGBTQ+ persons being fully realised.’130  
 
Equality goals are therefore questioned, and ‘legal equality’ cannot be seen as the end of the struggle.131 
Hamilton referencing others considers that perhaps citizenship theorists should move away from 
‘contested understandings of equality.’132 Instead wider conceptions of citizenship could be considered 
to include considerations of responsibilities towards the wider community and social processes through 
which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights.133 This view of 
citizenship includes the drive to question what it means to be included and to belong.134  This entails a 
sociologically informed definition of citizenship in which the emphasis is less on legal rules and more 
on normal practices, meanings and identities.135 There would no longer be total reliance on the ‘formal 
relationship between the individual and the state’ but instead there should be ‘a more total relationship 
inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of 




126 Donovan referring to Matthew Todd, Straight Jacket. How to be Gay and Happy (Black Swann, 2018). 
127 Donovan.  
128Donovan referring to for example, Carol Smart, The Ties the Bind. Law, Marriage and the Reproduction of 
Patriarchal Relations. (Routledge 1984). 
129  Brian Heaphy, Carol Smart and Anna Einarsdottir (eds), Same Sex Marriages: New Generations, New 
Relationships (Palgrave MacMillan 2013) 132. 
130 As also discussed by Jyl Josephson, ‘Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage and Feminist Criitques of Marriage’ 
(2005) 3 Perspectives on Politics 269. 
131 Donovan also referring to Robert Leckey, After Legal Equality. Family, Sex, Kinship (Routledge 2015). 
132 Hamilton.  
133 Hamilton referring to Ruth Lister, ‘Why Citizenship: Where, How and Why Children’ (2007) 8 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 693 and Engin F. Isin and Bryan S Turner, ‘Citizenship Studies: An Introduction’ in Engin F. 
Isin, and Bryan Turner (eds) Handbook of Citizenship Studies (Sage, 2002). 
134 Hamilton referring to Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and 
Belonging (Stanford University Press 2007). 
135 Hamilton referring to Lister (n 133). 
136 Pnina Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Introduction: Women and the New Discourse of Citizenship in Pnina 
Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis (Eds) Women, Citizenship and Difference (Zed, 1999). 
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a ‘more meaningful and direct way’137  and for EU citizens to feel a sense of belonging to the EU.138 
This is arguably of essential importance for the EU in a Brexit era. Hamilton accords with authors who 
consider citizenship as an aspirational ideal which is ‘…less than complete.’139 One of the driving forces 
of change is the need to accommodate new populations.140 As this book has demonstrated a key question 
is to continually evaluate how to include otherwise ‘disenfranchised’ LGBTQ+ groups.141  
 
Donovan reflects points made by Ryan, that ultimately legal change alone will not ‘change the attitudes, 
assumptions and hostility that led to the legal inequalities in the first place.142 Whilst legal change is 
credited in providing ‘ideological messages…’ it continues to raise concern about the possibility of 
‘backlash…’ 143   In considering the inter-relationship between public opinion and legal change, 
incrementalist scholars set out a step-by-step process, otherwise known as the theory of small change, 
which allows change over time144 therefore ‘permitting gradual adjustment of antigay mind-sets, slowly 
empower[ing]... gay right advocates and ...discredit[ing] antigay arguments’. 145 Proponents of this 
theory argue that this is supported by statistics which demonstrate the correlation between favourable 
public opinion and legal change in order to achieve long-term successful change.146  Aloni comments 
that the ‘incrementalist path is corroborated by the experience of many nations…’147 and advocates 
consider that it results in a ‘policy which minimizes backlash.’148 Many of the chapters in this book 
have endorsed an incrementalist method of change not least Clayton-Helm, Noto La Diega and Sperti.149 
Maine’s data analysis demonstrates that his interviewees did ‘… posit civil partnerships as a stepping-
 
137 Hamilton referring to Helen Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family under EU Law – Lessons from the ECHR’ (2002) 
16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 410, 413. See also Frances Hamilton, ‘The Differing 
Treatment of Same Sex Couples by European Union Law and the European Convention on Human Rights: The 
European Union Concept of Citizenship’ (2015) 2 Journal of International and Comparative Law 87. 
138 See Hamilton referring to Kate Nash, ‘Between Citizenship and Human Rights’ (2004) 43 Sociology 1067,1068 
and Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream (Routledge 2007). 
139 Hamilton referring to Lydia Morris, ‘Citizenship and Human Rights: Ideals and Actualities (2012) 63 British 
Journal of Sociology 39; David Lockwood, ‘Civil Integration and Class Formation’ (1996) 47 British Journal of 
Sociology 531, 536.  
140 Hamilton referring to Gershon Shafir and Alison Brysk, ‘The Globalization of Rights: From Citizenship to 
Human Rights’ (2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 275, 279; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal 
Theory of Minority Rights (OUP 1995). 
141 Shafir and Byrsk (n 140) 279. 
142 Donovan and Ryan. 
143 Donovan referring to Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women (Three Rivers 
Press 1991). 
144 Waaldijk (n 36) 437. 
145 William Eskridge Jr, Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights (Routledge 2002). 
146 See David Masci and Drew Desilver, ‘A Global Snapshot of Same-Sex Marriage’ (Pew Research Center, 21 
June 2019) <www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/04/global-snapshot-sex-marriage/> accessed 16 
September 2019. The Pew Research Center conducts surveys annually in 17 nations on this subject.  
147 Aloni.  
148 Aloni.  
149 Clayton-Helm, Noto La Diega and Sperti. 
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stone towards same-sex marriage’ arguably therefore supporting the incrementalist paradigm.150 Yet 
Aloni critiques the actual steps set out in the incrementalist model.151 He argues that although the 
experience of most nations was to follow the incrementalist steps, high profile exceptions remain.152 He 
also raises questions about the time taken to move between stages. In a policy that prefers ‘compromise’ 
this could arguably ‘trivialize the harm of those who are harmed by the ban…’153  He explains that the 
incrementalist model could help to explain the very slow progress made in Asia and Africa, where many 
nations still criminalise same-sex intimacy. 154  He refers to Badgett who explains that one of the 
problems here is that incrementalists  ‘..offer no clear idea about how long each incremental step should 
take….’155 He also argues that the focus on marriage equality as a goal is a false one as it means that 
attention is ‘explicitly or impliedly diver[ted] … from other alternative and innovative innovation 




Although 28 states worldwide now recognise same-sex marriage157 and others some level of civil 
partnership, many countries continue to ‘other’ same-sex relationships either by leaving them 
unrecognized or by criminalising them.158 At a pan- European level both the CJEU and the ECtHR are 
at a cross roads with regards to future development. Whilst different European countries have had 
varying responses to advances in EU law, many of the chapters in this book are optimistic about the 
potential role of the EU in expanding rights for LGBTQ+ persons, same-sex couples and rainbow 
families.159 The EU concept of citizenship offers an ever-expanding array of practical rights offering 
opportunities for new groups in society including LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples. Of 
prominence within the expanding group of rights include those of free movement and non-
discrimination rights. Further the EU offers the possibility of a unified conflicts of law system. A 
consequent effect of Brexit could also mean that UK LGBTQ+ persons and same-sex couples will not 
benefit from these expanding rights.  When considering the road of individual countries to recognising 




152 Aloni.  
153 Aloni.  
154 Aloni.  
155 Aloni referring to M V Lee Badgett, ‘Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the European Experience in 
the United States’ (2005) 17 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 71, 75. 
156 Aloni referring to Libby Adler, Gay Priori: A Queer Critical Legal Studies Approach to Law Reform (Duke 
University Press 2018) 104.  
157 See introduction n 2.  
158 See, ‘72 Countries where homosexuality is illegal’ (76 Crimes, 11 June 2019) <https://76crimes.com/76-
countries-where-homosexuality-is-illegal/> Accessed 16 Sep 2019 
159 See Hamilton, Noto La Diega, Clayton-Helm, Tryfonidou and Schuster.  
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this edited collection all entail the necessity of both legal and social change to ensure the long-term 
success and acceptance of same-sex relationships. Differences between court based and legislative 
methods should not be overstated as prior to leading court judgments, earlier work had already been 
done in advancing public opinion and creating the ‘necessary relationships between movements, 
governments officials and citizens..’160  Whilst legalisation of same-sex marriage by means of a public 
vote in ROI and Australia, perhaps entailed the ultimate attempt at  public engagement, both these 
instances have been critiqued by the authors in the collection on the basis that they only took place due 
to deadlock between different branches of government.161  The status of civil partnership is disputed 
between those who see it as having an ‘intrinsic status’162 and those who see it as a ‘downgrade.’163 In 
any event further reform of civil partnership should not be without necessary consultation.164   
 
However, even for those countries which have achieved same-sex marriage, many of the chapters in 
this edited collection demonstrate that this is not a conclusion in itself. Legal and social change need to 
work together with regard to future development of legal regulation of same-sex relationships and 
rainbow families, the status of civil partnership and the lived reality of equality of LGBTQ+ persons. 
Whilst incrementalism allows a model of ‘small change’165 this is subject to critique.166 There remain 
ongoing issues for LGBTQ+ persons who do not fit into the monogamous categories which are given 
legal protection.167 Other marginalized individuals, such as LGBTQ+ individuals experiencing DVA, 
may simply not be able to bring forwards claims to rights if they are disconnected from appropriate 
social groups and without support in a society which values individualism and characterizes DVA in 
heteronormative terms.168 Other issues include the contested status of LGBTQ+ education in schools 
and continued high levels of homo-bi transphobia169  and the high level of homophobic hate crime.170 
New challenges constantly need to be considered not least the issue of certain Australian states bringing 
 
160 Sperti referring to Siegel (n 43) 1731. 
161 Tobin and Richardson-Self et al. 
162 ECtHR in Oliari v Italy (n 82).  
163 Noto La Diega 
164 Hayward. 
165 Waaldijk (n 36).  
166 Aloni. 
167 Maine and Donovan. 
168 Donovan. 
169 Donovan referring to Metro, Youth Chances: Integrated Report (Metro Charity 2016) 
<https://metrocharity.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-
04/National%20Youth%20Chances%20Intergrated%20Report%202016.pdf> accessed 20 July 2019. 
170 Donovan referring to Adam Lusher, ‘Homophobic attacks rose 147 per cent after the Brexit vote’ The 
Independent (London, October 9 2016) <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-hate-crime-




forward right to discriminate on religious grounds. 171  For proponents of same-sex marriage the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage in 28 jurisdictions should be represented in an optimistic light. 
Perhaps this could result in a ‘beneficial reappraisal of the role of marriage in society…’172  for everyone 
regardless of sexual orientation. There remains much work to be done to be a truly globally LGBTQ+ 
inclusive society.  
 
 
171 Richardson-Self et al referring to New South Wales currently considering the Anti-Discrimination 
Amendment (Religious Freedoms) Bill 2018 (NSW), ‘which would allow broad ranging discrimination on the 
basis of religious belief. 
172 Hayward referring to Obergefell v Hodges (n 27). 
